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DEPOLITICIZATION AND LAWYERS'
FUNCTIONS: REFLECTIONS FOR A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
By MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON*

Sociologists ought to have serious doubts about how much of the
practice of an occupation and the meaning it holds for practitioners can
be known from the outside. The doubts are compounded when the practice
is based on esoteric knowledge, and even more so when the outcomes
that can be attributed to the practice are not obvious but require
interpretation and often difficult assessment.
Even considering systematic descriptions of legal professions, it is
far from evident that one who is neither a lawyer nor a legal scholar
can grasp the most significant implications of a descriptive sociology
of lawyers as would be seen "from the inside." What is most interesting
and distinctive about lawyers is their relation to the law. Description,
by itself, cannot touch the depth and complexity of that relationship.
Professions are phenomena of social practice. Their apparent unity
is created by the images that different sectors of the public hold of various
occupations and by their respective place in the social division of labour.
Obviously, all categories of workers actively contribute to the formation
of such public images, both self-consciously and by their practice. All
workers, especially if they are organized, fight for a place - to gain
or defend it - in the hierarchical organization of work. Professionals
do this more deliberately than most other workers. They themselves decide
what the general duties of their calling are and define, within these broad
boundaries, some minimal guidelines of performance. Professionals have
an interest in sustaining a consensus around the minimal "functional
core" of expertness that is vaguely understood by outsiders as an area
of interchangeability. Within this area, anyone who wears a generic
professional label should be equivalent to anyone else., Professional
dignity, in part, depends on refusing to perform functions other than
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those the professional can relate to that nebulous "core" unless the solicited
performances pertain in some way to a social status above that of the
professional's own.2
As Howard Becker has observed, "profession" is a "folk concept."
However, so are the concepts of lawyer, physician, architect, engineer,
or clergyman.3 It is both by a profession's public discourse and by its
members' practices that such latent folk concepts are created. These form
pieces of a larger cognitive map of the social division of labour and
are in counterpoint with still broader notions of law, health and disease,
aesthetic propriety, technological efficiency, and the divine. What professionals contribute to their society's ideal values is difficult to determine.
Their contribution is too variable, diverse, and closely intertwined with
elements from other sources for its impact to be clearly discerned. In
principle, it is easier to examine the received notions of what professionals
do rather than their daily effect on societal values.
This paper will start with the "folk concept" of lawyer's work,
disentangle it with the help of comparative studies, and reach toward
the "functional core." From there, it should be possible to place lawyers
more accurately within the organization of intellectual work.
The problems arise as soon as the two classical lawyerly functions
of representation and defense are considered. The problems come not
so much from the many variations these functions admit in form, scope,
and relative importance; nor because it is not possible in the present
state of our knowledge of legal professions to draw typical sequences
of functional diversification. Rather, they come from the legal professions'
privileged relationship to the state which is suggested by the notions
of representation and defence. The broadest definition of legal work
involves, at the core, knowledge of the "language of the state" that entails
speaking to the state and for the state., The notion of "speaking" suggests
2 We may reasonably expect that a young lawyer in an important firm, who would not dream
of typing a letter for a senior partner, would be glad to cook for him on a camping trip. "Dirty
work" comes into existence when there are others of lower status to whom unpleasant or routine
activities can be sloughed off.
3 It is obviously necessary to ask which sectors of the public hold what folk concept and
what has formed it. Indirectly, we could presume that the appearance of legal aid services would
have changed poor peoples' perception of lawyers as they came into contact with them. Even
independently of how many actually used their services, 60 percent of 1260 eligible poor people
had never heard of legal aid in 1978, after federally funded legal services had been operating
for thirteen years. Evidence from comparable studies made in the U.K., Australia, and Mexico
is often more disappointing. See R.L. Abel, "Law Without Politics: Legal Aid under Advanced
Capitalism" (1985) 32 U.C.LAL. Rev. 474 at 602 note 768. It follows that only very special
sectors of the public would have concrete experiences with lawyers against which to check whatever
"folk concept" they hold. This reinforces the notion that professionals themselves play the most
important part in the definition or redefinition of their public image.
4 On this point, see D. Rueschemeyer, "Comparing Legal Professions Cross-nationally: From
a Professions-Centered to a State-Centered Approach" (1986) American Bar Foundation Research
Journal, 415-46.
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the constant innovation of innumerable performances governed by a
system of rules. By analogy, legal professionals "make law" in their
practice as one "makes language" in one's speech - within rules.
The notion of law as the "language of the state" carries the traces
of past political forms, political struggles, modes of behaviour, and
relations of production and manifests them in the present. The whole
institutional history of peoples and classes leaves its sediment in the
"language of the state" which every competent citizen is supposed to
know. This is the central difficulty of a sociology of lawyers: the legal
profession characteristically knows and uses a language that is not its
own. This belies simple notions of professional autonomy and immediately
involves everyone with the structure and history of the state. Any attempt
to transcend specific historical contexts by generalization is bound to
be more difficult and misleading in the case of the legal profession than
in any other professional group. The law is always specific, even if the
concept of law is not.
This paper will clarify both the typical functions that legal professionals are said to perform in the courts and beyond, and their sociopolitical implications. In this way, a framework win be established within
which it should be possible to ask some theoretical questions about lawyers
in the Western-type nations.
The numerical growth of people with legal training is, with few
exceptions, observed in all Western countries. There is a potential for
the expansion of the legal services market and for an increase in the
"transformation of experiences into grievances and grievances into
disputes."5 In some cases, the possible pressure from mounting numbers
of available lawyers may be connected to the provision of legal aid and
legal insurance schemes.6 Questions will be posed in this paper about
the possible connections of law and lawyers with the transformation of
political categories and political consciousness.
I. LAWYERS' FUNCTIONS AND THE "PARADOX OF LAW"
A. Representation and the Constitution of Citizenship
Lawyers do not create the law. If judges are excluded from that
category, lawyers are not even primarily responsible for its application.
5 W.L. Felstiner, L.R. Abel, & A. Sarat, "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming..." (1980-81) 15 Law and Soc'y Rev. 631 at 632.
6

See R.L. Abel, "The Politics of the Market for Legal Services" (Address to Conference

on "Legal Services in the Eighties," Faculty of Law, University College, Cardiff, 21-23 March

1980).
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They are, however, often inevitable intermediaries in the initial mobilization of perceived legal rights, either on behalf of a particular interested
party, or because they ask the courts to begin enforcement of accepted
legal norms.
All the complexities of the concept of representation are inherent
in these legal functions. Lawyers are, in part, mere agents of the law:
they are supposed to speak for it fairly and disinterestedly. They are
also the symbolic representatives of the state and the law. However,
they are more than authorized agents and symbols because at this stage
of complexity, citizens can no longer directly constitute the state and
"speak the law." Therefore, lawyers become the only professionals who
actually represent others7
Other forms of representation can occur by custom. In many
traditional societies, women are represented because they are not allowed
to speak for themselves in public, while younger family members are
represented without consultation by elders. In Western societies, the
irrational or the feeble-minded are similarly obligatorily represented for
some legal transactions, as are minors. This is not a right to representation,
but rather an ascribed or delegated authority of the representative over
the represented. Ascribed authority presumes the subordination of the
represented, while delegated authority appears to be based on the superior
competence of the representative and is, in principle, to be temporary.s
Representation by lawyers is of the latter kind.
In the tradition of private law, representation by either a partisan
or an impartial solicitor is a right of the parties to an action. The asymmetry
between the represented and the representative is in the knowledge of
normative codes, conventional procedures, and the limits of interpretation.
Representation by legal specialists ensures that codes are properly invoked
and judgments are formally equitable, thus creating at least a presumption
of equality before the law. Legal representation also implies a principle
of professionalization of both judges and lawyers. The question of access
to adequate representation then arises as a crucial practical expression
of access to justice.9

7 See generally H.F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (California: University of California
Press, 1967).
8 In traditional Indian law, family members are entitled to represent their relatives in court,
but they do not appear to have any special legal competence. See J.S. Gandhi, "Report on the
Legal Profession in India" (Address to the Working Group for the Comparative Study of the Legal
Professions, International Sociological Association, Bellagio, 16-21 July 1984) [unpublished].
9 It must be noted, however, that this access represents only the last stage in the public adjudication
of a grievance that must first be recognized as such, addressed to the culpable party, and rejected
by him or her. See Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra, note 5 at 635-37.
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As professional representatives, lawyers become entangled in the
far from seamless web of society's sense of justice. When a system of
courts appears and unifies the legal codes, they become a primary reference
point and a central battlefield for different conceptions of justice or,
perhaps more accurately, of injustice. As Barrington Moore observes:
When people talk about justice in general they are liable to be a bit woolly because
what they really have in mind is injustice and usually some specific injustice that
affects them or people like them.... For the victim injustice takes the form of
a painful intrusion upon one's private existence, an attack upon whatever limited
autonomy the individual has managed to achieve .... Plain citizens are often willing
to make painful sacrifices, to offer up life and limb for what they have learned
to regard as the common good.... Injustice, on the other hand, always has an
arbitrary component in the sense that what hurts has no believable justification.lo

Moore implies that notions of injustice/justice are articulated at the
boundary of what is considered public and private. According to the
meaning assigned to the intrusion, this boundary varies not only historically
and culturally, but also circumstantially. The boundary between what
is justifiably private and what is public is drawn and redrawn. Legal
representation can therefore be seen as a defense of private, but not
individual, meanings in front of authorities that claim the upper hand
in determining the legitimacy of intrusions.,

The ambivalence of legal representatives comes from the fact that
they must accept not the event or the speech, but the system or the
language. At times, lawyers may speak different languages representing
varied sources of right. E.P. Thompson illustrates this point.
What was often at issue was not property, supported by law, against no property;
it was alternative definitions of property-rights: for the landowner, enclosure for the cottager, common rights.... For as long as it remained possible, the ruled
- if they could find a purse and a lawyer - would actually fight for their rights
by means of law; occasionally the copyholders, resting upon the precedents of

10B. Moore, Jr., Privacy: Studies in Social and CulturalHistory (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,
1984) at 105-106.
11The problem of definition is solved if one adopts, with Judith ShkIar, the limited conception
of justice. Justice, she says,
is the commitment to obeying rules, to respecting rights, to accepting obligations under
a system of principles. It is the individual's consistent adherence to the morality of rolefollowing in a moral world where right and duty are the dominating issues.... Only one
aim, one habit of mind, is constant in all possible occasions when justice is demanded:
that a general rule be applied to an individual instance.
While I agree with Shklar that the ideology of legalism moves along a scale that goes from
courts and legal systems at one end to personal morality at the other, a conception of justice
such as hers assumes a high development of legalism both institutionally and culturally. It is a
reasonable, albeit tautological, hypothesis to think that rule following as a moral good presumes
the development (and perhaps even the codification) of a system of rules. In turn, this makes Shklar's
conception compatible, if not overlapping, with Moore's, since a system of roles for living in society
would include public private delineations. J. Shklar, Lega/ism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1964) at 113-14, 3.
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sixteenth-century law, could actually win a case. When it ceased to be possible
to continue the fight at law, men still felt a sense
of legal wrong: the propertied
had obtained their power by illegitimate means. 2

The unity of the law depends on the affirmation of central power
over and against the power of competing 61ites that render justice or
make law in their own jurisdiction. The advance of one judicial system
at the expense of another is both the mark and the instrument of
centralization of state power. In times of transition, more than one set
of legal principles may be in use until the dominance of a new legal
system is established. As Stanley Diamond has suggested, this also exists
in every confrontation between customary social morality and state law.13
The germs of legalism as a political ideology are contained in representation: when subjects bring their grievances to a court of law, the
authority they confer upon it implies that the court can be impartial
and follow the law as something that is 'there', separate from power
and politics, as rules that can be found.",
Legal representation subverts authoritarian forms of patriarchal
representation. At the same time, it establishes the law as the limits of
state power that are essentially contested and shifting boundaries between
the public and the private domains. Rights are articulated within these
domains, but they are only as solid as the boundary between them. The
boundary is solid if it is uncontested by individuals, groups, institutions
enjoying different measures of power, or the state itself. Two very different
historical examples illustrate this point.
In eighteenth-century France, centuries of access to royal courts
had established the right of communities to sue as corporate bodies.
In the second half of the century, often encouraged by the local
representatives of the royal bureaucracy and spurred by urban lawyers
in search of clients, many communes challenged seigneurial rights with
new breadth and aggressiveness. In most cases the peasants lost, but,
as Hilton Root observes:
The new legal battles were important because what had been based on custom
and tradition now became a problem to be discussed.... The Revolution accomplished in months what might have taken generations to achieve in the courts.
But the language with which the Constituent Assembly dissolved the feudal system
in 1789 was already present in court cases that pitted lord against peasant with
increasing regularity during the last half of the eighteenth century.5

12

E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (New York: Pantheon, 1975) at 261.

13 S. Diamond, "The Rule of Law versus the Authority of Custom" in Donald Blank and

Marueen Mileski, eds. The Social Organizationof Law (New York: Seminar Press, 1973). Diamond
refers to this confrontation as the "census-tax conscription system" at 327.
14 Shklar, supra, note 11 at 9.
Is H.L. Root, "Challenging the Seigneurie: Community and Contention on the Eve of the
French Revolution" (1985) 57 . of Mod. Hist. 652 at 673.

1986]

Depolitizaton and Lawyers' Functions

Litigation redefined seigneurial rights as intolerable intrusions upon the
communities' defensible area of liberty. The peasants' lawyers turned
whatever standardization of procedure the king's courts had achieved
into arguments against customary precedent, claiming that laws applying
to the entire province overrode particular seigneurial rights.16

John Owen Haley's discussion of Japanese informal justice shows
a very different kind of perceived intrusion. By the late eighteenth century,
Tokugawa Japan had developed a sophisticated legal system analogous
in many ways to Western procedure in the areas of commercial law,
registries, property claims, and the like. When the Meiji Constitution
introduced private law at the end of the nineteenth century, the new
notion of rights appeared to be deeply subversive to the familistic,
neoConfucian moral order, even though purportedly it was applied to
strengthen it. The sweeping patriarchal authority that had been granted
as a rightno longer tempered by traditional Confucian moderation, proved
so insufferable to subordinate family members that judges were prompted
to intervene on their behalf to restore some harmony between new law
and ancient custom. A redefinition of private powers initiated in the
public sphere appears to have so disturbed the private equilibrium of
family relations that the magistrates used their prerogatives to remedy
the new juridical powerlessness of wives and children, thus penetrating
deeper beyond the boundary of the private domain.
By the end of World War I, the process of litigation had itself come
to be seen both as a solvent of traditional piety, and as fuel for the
social conflicts that were mounting in the economic sphere. To discourage
litigation, the state restricted the number of judges, while legal traditionalists championed formal conciliation as an alternative to the alien
legal order characterized by the assertion of rights. Not surprisingly, the
traditionalists' conciliation statutes were opposed first and foremost by
lawyers for both practical and doctrinal reasons. In the 1920s, however,
the modem lawyers lost. Litigation failed to replace, though perhaps
not to modify, older patterned expressions of conflict and resistance17
Root's and Haley's studies stand in useful counterpoint to the analysis
that established seductive ahistorical homologies between the abstraction
of the commodity form (functioning "to 'extinguish' the 'memory' of
use-value and concrete labour") and the abstraction of the legal form
16Ibid at 672-73.
17 In the mid-1930s, the number of practising lawyers followed the decline of both civil trials

and binding conciliation cases, which had tended to become functional substitutes for the former.
Proportionally, lawyers in Japan have not regained the numbers they had reached in the first decline
of this century. K. Rokamoto, "The Legal Profession in Japan" (Address to the Working Group
for the Comparative Study of the Legal Professions, International Sociological Association, Bellagio,
16-21 July 1984) [unpublished].
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(functioning to "extinguish the memory of different interests and social
origins").18 Both examples command one to consider the genesis of legal

and political representation historically. It must be asked in which
historical circumstances and by which specific processes the legal and
the political orders have either tended to become alternative to one another
(so that legal activation of the "language of the state" discourages and
precludes the politicalperformance of "speech acts" by mobilized citizens)
or instead, have developed as mutually reinforcing arenas where citizens
actively "speak" their rights. As Root's study suggests, the question is
inseparable from what jurists may contribute to the constitution of the
state in the form of legal discourse that develops dialectically from their
representation of either the rulers or the ruled.
The homology between legal and commodity forms is not interesting
in itself but for the underlying analogical reference to language. One
author explicitly introduces this and shows that law, like grammar, is
"autonomous and independent of meaning.",+ Sharing a common code
does not prejudge the semantic content of speech or the scope of discourse;
it makes it possible to speak together. For Chomsky, linguistic competence
is the acquisition (or the activation) of the generative rules of transformational grammar. Our only access to a speaker's competence is
through his or her other linguistic performances. Competence, however,
is the capacity to master structures which determine the possibility and
the commensurability of performance in a language. The learning of
a foreign language clarifies the difference. Without understanding the
language (or even wanting to learn it), we know that it has rules. Through
performance, however, apprentice speakers involve themselves ever more
deeply in rule-governed creativity and innovation, and this makes the
rules of the new grammar recede. They tend to be forgotten and to
become less easily available as mastery of them becomes deeper.2o
The implications of the linguistic analogy with the law are in part
negative. Superficially, it is not difficult to see the parallel between
competence/performance and legal codes/specific laws or applications.
18I.D. Balbus, "Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy of
Law" (1977) 11 Law and Soc'y Rev. 571 at 576. Alternatively, in the classic formulation by
Pashukanis, cited in Balbus, "all the specific peculiarities distinguishing one representative of the
species homo sapiens from another are dissolved in the abstraction of man in general as a juridic
subject." Ibid at 577.
It is interesting to note that the dissolution of ascribed inequalities, stigmatizing traits, and
gender or racial peculiarities is not seen as a good in this kind of bizarre romanticism that contrasts
concreteness to abstraction and takes for granted the superiority of the former. Even where
commodities are concerned, mass production offers undeniable gains to the masses over craft or
petty commodity production.
19Balbus, ibid at 584-85.
20 N. Chomsky, Selected Readings (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) at 21, c. 1, 6, 7.
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Beyond this, there is also the rationalist notion of deep-seated formal
linguistic universals and the notion of mind itself, by whose intrinsic
properties universals must ultimately be explained. These are admittedly
controversial notions, but it is heuristically interesting to suggest a parallel
with the notion of normativity as a fundamental property of social life.
A parallel can also be drawn with deep normative structures that conjugate
such general concepts as agent, obligation, right, claim, possession, and
the couples ego/alter, private/public, or right/wrong up to the sophisticated
concepts that a philosophy of law would uncover.
On a less general level, grammar is universally, albeit unknowingly,
shared by the speakers of a language, while the encoding of social reality
into the language of law is not shared, at least not beyond the narrow
limits within which direct democracy is possible. Law is the "language
of the state," spoken by its legal personnel, and they appropriate not
the content of the language but its transformative rules.21 Theirs is the
mastery of competence.
Once a system of laws is accepted (that is, once it can be routinely
administered because of the stabilization of power relations), even the
non-speakers must accept it as a meta-language of social life existing
at, and in fact constituting, the boundary between legitimate and filegitimate intrusions. As non-speakers get involved (directly or indirectly)
with legal performances in which only the competent speak, either they
resist the translation of their claims into legal language (and they choose
to fight for their "meaning" outside the law), or they gradually integrate
their own notions of right and wrong, legitimate and illegitimate, with
those performances. By analogy, the recognition of performances in the
foreign language of law does not demand widespread competence but
the awareness of a "linguistic" arena in which rival conceptions of rights
appear to be translatable into one another. Jurists are the translators.
A similar idea can be expressed through the legalistic conception
of justice as "the commitment to obeying rules, to respecting rights, to
accepting obligations under a system of principles."2 Consciously or not,
lawyers and those who have absorbed the ideology of legalism try to
reduce morality to this. It can never be effectively reduced to one system
of rules in any but the most homogeneous society. Nevertheless, as soon
as the language of the law is spoken with authority, the lawyers' version
of justice as impartial rule-following becomes admissible by all, and the
possibility of translation into that system of rules becomes conceivable.
21

In Chomsky's theory of grammar, the transformative rules generate both deep and surface

structures and express the relations between them. They are, as he says, the theory of a language.
22 Shklar, supra, note 11 at 113 and ff.
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The heart of the notion of legal representation is the belief that
one's substantive rights and claims shall be recognized in the legal system
if properly expressed and heard. That is the paradox of law. As the linguistic
analogy suggests, legality is never as deeply grasped as in the breach,
in the same way that ungrammatical usage is immediately perceived
as something that breaks rules one would not know how to state.3 In
turn, the paradox of law further suggests a hypothesis that those social
groups who carry substantive notions ofjustice, rooted in customary social
morality and traditional social arrangements, need the foil of formal
legality in order to fuse their own notions of rights with the vision of
an extended universalistic order of social justice under the law. The
generative experience can be one of either legal justice or injustice. What
matters is the dialectics of usage and codes (or substantive and formal
notions). For the minority who is ever represented by them, lawyers are
the mediators of such dialectical experiences. They serve either as
grammarians or as translators and can, if necessary, spell out the rules.
The ease of performing this formal task varies with the level of codification
of law. However, since even the application of detailed written codes
requires difficult interpretation, the legalistic presumption (that rules are
there to be found) becomes the cornerstone of a typical ideology. The
occupational ideology of legalism is "the operative outlook of the legal
profession"24 and should be of immediate political consequence.
Lawyers represent because it is the way they make a living: it is
their duty. They may also represent on the basis of their convictions.25
Representation in courts of law constitutes an embryonic nucleus that
contains the possibility of citizenship and, even at this stage, reveals its
23 The Durkheimian notion that deviance is there to be punished, that is, to strengthen the
norms of the collective consciousness, is, of course, the functionalist version of what I am saying.
I do not wish to imply any function. Although it is obvious that acceptance of the law is indispensable
for a social order to exist and to continue existing, discovery of injustice at law can be a most
powerful mobilizing experience for social movements seeking "the true law." Shklar expresses the
same notion of reinforcement of adherence to the law, though in the pejorative sense of the ideology
of legalism:
Without consensus, the appearance of [judicial] neutrality evaporates. Every offended party
characteristically responds to a decision by accusing judges of "legislating." It is not the
law, which is clearly far from self-evident, but the judge, who is at fault, and an erring
judge is a legislating judge, since the losing party begins its case by presenting its version
of the true law. The result is that, as denunciation of "law making" multiply, the legalistic
ethos is reinforced and the likelihood of judges satisfying it becomes increasingly rare.
Shklar, supra,note 11 at 12-13.
24 Ibd at 8.
2 Throughout this discussion I have taken representation to include defense. This is not to
deny the differences between the two classic functions, which are as great and as theoretically
important as are the differences between civil and criminal law, but rather to avoid a discussion
that I am not competent to conduct. It would not change the basic fact of representation: speaking
for someone, in order to bestow upon him or her the benefits of superior judicial competence,
and in his or her interest.
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conditions and limitations. In the classical liberal sense, citizenship can
be said to extend notions of personal rights and delegation of powers
from the legal to the political arena. The parallel between these two
dimensions of representation is obviously rooted in their common genesis
within the same Western European and bourgeois matrix. More than
a parallel, it is, in fact, a commonality of structure and form in which
the lawyer's role prefigures that of the professional politician in repre-

sentative democracies.26 Lawyers continue to be chosen as speakers for
their forensic bravura just as politicians are elected for their eloquence
or their media appeal. The emphasis on rhetorical talent corresponds
to the function of symbolic representation/personalization:jurists represent
and personify the law and therefore the state; politicians represent and
personify the sovereignty of their constituents and therefore the nation.
Both are dramatic figures on a public stage watched with passion by
participants and indifference by others. Neither, however, are merely
symbolic representatives.
In modem representative democracies, the politician cannot legitimately represent individual interests. Arguably, the function of politics
is to transcend the liberal conception of representation as representation
of persons. If we take "interests" in the pejorative sense of American
political terminology as selfish "special interests" indifferent to the
"common good," politics is the means by which persons transcend their
private interests and discover public or collective ones. Lawyers, however,
are professional representatives of persons whose function is, in principle,
purely instrumental. They represent because they are ordered by clients
to act on their behalf.27
26 There is also what is suggested by a reading of Foucault: the courtroom becomes integrated
with society and its ways of knowledge, signalling that the subjects have become something separate
from their king and that a different notion of sovereignty is therefore becoming possible to conceive.
As the trial of criminals in the age of Enlightenment gradually becomes subject to common truth
conditions (the same that are accepted in society at large), their punishment becomes increasingly
governed by almost utilitarian estimations of deterrence: the horrible rituals of torment by which
the King demonstrated his excess of power are dangerous occasions of arousal for a populace
no longer held in a symbiotic unity with its ruler.
The lawyer's entrance into the courtroom under new competence requirements is part of the
gradual change in the articulation of domination between state power and the ruled. The new
juridical rituals and the spectacle of the courtroom are thus part of the establishment of the new
disciplines. M. Foucault, DisciplineandPunish trans. A. Sheridan (New York. Vintage Books, 1979).
27 I am not competent to discuss what is involved in representing a corporate entity, although
I know, of course, that the matter was resolved in American law by accepting that corporate entities
be treated at law as persons. In sociological terms, the question is empirical: who monitors and
directs legal services to the corporation? Part of the answer is obvious: it depends on the client's
power and on the internal organization of the corporate entity. For many corporate entities today,
the task is performed by lawyers from their own legal departments. While this may restrict the
autonomy and even the discretionary freedom of outside counsel, it should at least have the merit
of making the relationship more technically legal than before, therefore freeing the negotiations
from a good deal of "translation" work. While this may reduce the primacy of outside counsel
in giving to the problem its legal expression, it augments, if anything, the thoroughness of legal
transformational work.
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The level of truth of this proposition corresponds to the level of
sophistication of the client or the simplicity of the case. Lawyers have
total primacy in redefining the client's situation so as to adjust his or
her needs to the rules of the legal system. In the negotiations between
individual clients and their lawyers, empirical evidence suggests that "a
legal picture of the client" emerges, "a picture through which a self
acceptable to the legal process is negotiated and validated."28 The
construction is necessarily formalistic and reductionist. The clients'
meanings (their sense of justice and injustice) may be violated as they
discover simultaneously that they have rights, but that they do not make
for good legal argument. Yet, there is no possible way in which a person,
acting on his or her own, or speaking for a corporate entity would lose
the notion that this is his or her case and that it involves personal interests.
Even if the client finds that these interests have been too narrowly
construed and comes to feel betrayed by the lawyers, the interests are
recognized because they are individual. The analogy with translation
is apt - there is reduction, loss, and distortion of meanings, but recognition
of a basic semantic core remains. The politician does not translate interests
but rather interprets, invents, and transforms them.
In the liberal tradition, the principle of representation of persons
is only coherent in the legal arena where it is first articulated. As a
foundation for the conception of citizenship, it harbours inescapable
inconsistencies, for individual interests cannot be added and still be
recognized. The principle of politics is that the active transformation
of private into public must be consciously admitted and accepted by
individuals. This means that a new kind of interest must emerge.29
Here, then, is a first indication of why and how the persistent recourse
to legal strategies for the solution of problems or disputes belonging
in the public realm is profoundly depoliticizing: legal representation
inevitably reinforces the ideological primacy of private interests by the
mere fact that they are easiest to recognize and articulate in the language
28 A. Sarat & L.F. Felstiner, "Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office" (1986) 20
Law and Soc'y Rev., 93 at 116. The studies of civil disputes and no-fault divorce indicate that
it is a "self' constructed by the "form of claims and counter-claims under ... rules" that have
been established are nonetheless baffling and uncertain predators of the outcomes. Shklar, supra,
note I1 at 10. The uncertainty, in turn, appears to concede pragmatic preeminence to cost-benefit
estimates. See generally FeIstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra, note 5; A. Blumberg, "The Practice of
Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession" (1967) 1 Law and Soc'y
Rev. 15; S. Macaulay, "Contract Law Among American Businessmen" in D. Black & M. Mileski,
eds., The Social OrganizationofLaw (New York: Seminar Press, 1973) c. 5; L. Mather & B. Yngvesson,
"Language, Audience and the Transformation of Disputes" (1980-81) 15 Law and Soc'y Rev.
775.
29 1 am restating Bentham's dilemma: a purely individualistic concept of interest would cancel
the possibility of political representation. Bentham postulates that there is a selfish (self-regarding)
interest and a social one. See Pitkin, supra, note 7 at 198-208.
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of claims.30 It is the image of a substantive public interest that is weakened,
not a private one. This is despite the fact that citizens become attached
to the idea of legal justice and radical formal equality while exercising
their right to representation. These confrontations with authority are
mediated by specialized speakers. The represented thus unlearn the
effectiveness of their own speech. The lawyer's role is, from very early,
one of specialized competence. Therefore, the embryonic image of
citizenship contains, at birth, the shadow of the experts' appropriation
of public things.
B. The Appropriation of State-ConstituentFunctions
The classic representational function of lawyers is both a dimension
and a source of the liberal conception of citizenship. Rights can be invoked
as shields by citizens who appeal to the state in the "language of law."
Lawyers, as the most competent speakers, are mediators between state
power and citizens. The advocate's role has two faces: translation of
rights and interests (defence representation), and, transmission of state
law (subjection of the represented to the power of law). This is recognized
in all state forms that have reached a modicum of complexity, even
though the subjects may not have the right to speak back or initiate
the exchange as they formally have in the liberal tradition.3,
Establishing a judicial system that would "speak" the state or the
king's law to hitherto deaf or unattainable subjects has been, as Foucault
observes:
...a fundamental historical trait of Western monarchies: they were constructed
as systems of law, they expressed themselves through theories of law, and they
made their mechanisms of power work in the form of law... Law was not simply
a weapon skilfully wielded by monarchs; it was the monarchic system's mode
of manifestation and the form of its acceptability.32

State power, by definition, must claim to be hegemonic. In the Western
tradition, hegemony is claimed in the name of a transcendent law which
30 Recourse to legal strategies is not depoliticizing because it reduces the legal actor to his
or her atomized individuality as found by Balbus (supra, note 18). The legal process can also
serially aggregate individual interests into classes, in the mode of additive depoliticized politics.
It is also not merely because the legal process contains social conflict within an arena where the
rules of the game are so often biased against the powerless, for this too can be an educational
and even a transformative process. P. Gabel & P. Harris, "Building Power and Breaking Images:
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law" (1982-83) N.Y.U. Rev. of L. and Soc. Change
369.
31 This attribute is so commonplace that the Working Group on the Comparative Study of
Legal Professions includes this mediation function in its protocol definition of lawyer, jurist, attorney,
legal profession, et cetera.
32 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980)
at 87.
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must be followed by kings in order to be obeyed by subjects. This founds
the right to representation. Thus, when the rulers of new states or new
regimes want to present and develop their power in the guise of law
(their "power-as-law"33), they need a body of jurists to staff the judicial
branch of their state apparatus. Because the jurists must "speak" in a
transcendent code, they cannot be simply appointed; they must also be
independently trained. Either self-producing corporations of professionals
or appointed law faculties will have to do the teaching.34 The degree
of formalization of teaching will obviously vary, with apprenticeship at
the low end and teaching for a quasi-civil service at the high end. The
distinction between a state-sponsored profession and a free profession
is significant in many respects but does not change the general implications
of the transcendence of law. Mastery of the codes qualifies legal
professionals for interpreting, elaborating, and applying them.
The legal function of representation appears to qualify lawyers for
political representation and to account, in part, for the disproportionate
role lawyers have played in representative democracies. Because lawyers
can appropriate the "language of the state" directly, their noncontentious
functions can also easily extend from private advice, negotiations, and
drafting of institutionalized arrangements to what can be called a stateconstituent or constitutional function (preparatory legislation and crafting
of statutes), legal codes, and public charters. Legists appear to be most
directly qualified for public service as both servants of the state and
representatives of the people, as long as the state speaks primarily a
juridical "language," rather than a "language" of economic development,
or public works, or war.
Western ideas of hegemony in the law and conceptions of legal
rights were carried the world over in the wake of European expansion.
These forms appeared in other lands either as open contradictions of
colonial rule or as alien ideology imposed (more rarely, borrowed) in
the context of unequal power and unequal exchange. European legal
traditions and instruments were used as a rhetorical cloak in the dependent
parts of the world to justify expropriation, desecration, and ruthless
violations of human rights. Yet, the struggles they set in motion were
shaped by the paradox of law. Here, the paradox must be expressed
as that which, in setting limits to the arbitrariness of power, constitutes
the political struggles of peoples or classes as struggles to take over
in the name of a law. As Foucault so clearly states, the constitution
33Ibid
34 Rokamoto, supra,note 17; Rueschemeyer, supra,note 4; J.O. Haley, "The Politics of Informal
Justice: The Japanese Experience, 1922-42" in R.L. Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice,vol. 2

(New York Academic Press, 1982) c. 5.
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of hegemonic power under the law produces at all levels (".... [T]he
subject opposite the monarch, the citizen opposite the state, the child
opposite the parent, or the disciple opposite the master.") "a legislative
power on one side, and an obedient subject on the other."35 Ideally, "power
must be exercised in accordance with a fundamental lawfulness."36 Thus,
the role of jurists appears to be as ancient and continuous as the very
assertion of hegemonic power. At this level of generality, lawyers of
all kinds always speak for "power-as-law." Their role is essentially and
inescapably conservative. Even when they write codes of law inspired
by new principles of rights or contribute to the fundamental charters
of revolutionary states, the state-constituent function of lawyers is to
lay down stable, defensible foundations for powers whose justice need
go no farther than that law.
If it is granted that the basis of conservative continuity in the lawyers'
role is their special functional relation to state power, one must consider
the discontinuities that lie immediately beyond the general and essentialist
level. From the eighteenth century on, lawyers have been salient actors
in the movements against absolutist monarchies and in the movements
of national independence against colonial rule. As Hilton Root suggests,
the lawyers' need to make a living prompted them to seek clients among
the better off peasant communities. The substance of their expertise was
to blend legal argument with the peasants' own memory of rights and
common sense critique of obsolescent feudalism. Challenging customary
law in royal courts and preparing a revolutionary legal discourse as they
did in France or throwing back in the face of the colonial rulers their
own violated principles of right as they did in India, the most farsighted
among lawyers may indeed have joined the bravest in opposition.
Revolution and national independence tend to split the category of legal
specialists in two: those who can still practice and those who cannot.
For the former, opportunities to provide the new state with new codes
and the legal profession with new statutes are greatest in post-revolutionary
times.37

Revolutionary situations are only one extreme example of the
paradoxical effects that the connection with the "census-tax-conscription
system" has upon the category of the jurists. It also gives the occupation
a basic functional continuity of form, while subordinating its internal
structure and the contents of its practice to the discontinuous historical
developments of state forms and political regimes.
35 Foucault, supra, note 32 at 85.
36 Ibid

at 88.

37 M. Burrage, "Revolution as a Starting Point for the Comparative Analysis of the Legal

Profession" (Address to the Working Group for the Comparative Study of the Legal Professions,
International Sociological Association, Bellagio, 16-21 July, 1984) [unpublished].
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In England, before the revolution, the Crown had been quite
successful in reducing the power of the nobility. At the national level,
the Crown's hegemonic drive was supported by the unification of English
society after the Norman conquest, the early centralization of royal power,
the Crown's large manorial possessions, and the contingency of a full
treasury. 38 Two particular features can be schematically singled out in
the failure of English absolutism in the seventeenth century. First, the
tripartite nature of the ruling class implied that Henry VIII would need
the support of the nobility in his move against the church.39 Second,
the interpenetration of royal and feudal institutions at the local level
precluded the segregation of royal and seigneurial jurisdictions. The
Crown allowed the formation of "an unpaid aristocratic selfadministration ... which was later to evolve into the Justices of the
Peace of the early modem epoch."4o In the early sixteenth century, the
rising gentry, encouraged by the Crown, had begun to concentrate in
its hands both land and county offices. At the local level, it replaced
the power of the absentee magnates. The gentry's growing control over
the Commissions of the Peace was an extremely significant tool of class
organization. The Justices had the possibility of interpreting the common
law systematically in their own class interest therefore acquiring a legal
upper hand in their battle against the peasants' customary rights.41 The
early judicialization of the conflict between landlord and peasant appears
related to at least two class features of the gentry: it included an influential
contingent of professionals, especially solicitors and barristers, and it was
particularly well educated in the law. These traits went well with the
legalism of English Puritanism and imparted a specific ideological vision
of the common law and the constitution to the conflict between Parliament
and Crown.42
In France, the centrifugality of a larger and more divided territory
had to be controlled by the kings in order to gain direct access to the
surplus produced by the peasantry. Segregation of jurisdictions followed
logically from the battle for control of local institutions between king
and nobles, laying the base for the professionalization and standardization
of the centralized royal system of justice. While the advance of the

P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974) at 113-42.
On this point, see Anderson, supra,note 38; and L. Stone, The Causesofthe English RevolutW
1529-1642 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).
40 Anderson, ibid at 116.
41 R. Lachmann, "Feudal Elite Conflict and the Origins of English Capitalism" (1985) 3 Pol.
and Soc. 349.
42 Stone, supra,note 39 at 72-76, 97-105.
38

39
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monarchic state apparatus in the seventeenth century delivered the middle
and lower orders to the oppressive fiscal demands of the French Crown,
it also maintained continuously open the possibility of conflict regarding
levels of taxation between the nobility and the king. The presence in
the provinces of a reliable corps of tax farmers, intendants, and other
royal representatives both augmented the king's power and exasperated
the opposition. From this, the revolutionary storm was in part nourished.,3
The success of absolutist monarchy, as well as its failure in England,
depended partly on constructing above the piecemeal edifice of feudal
particularism a system of legal legitimizations for central power. The
revival of Roman law not only introduced into the civil society of late
medieval Europe the Roman conception of "unconditional private property," but it also reestablished, in the public sphere, legal justifications
for administrative centralization and discretionary power.
just as it was the canon lawyers within the Papacy who had essentially built
and operated its far-reaching administrative controls over the Church, so it was
semi-professional bureaucrats trained in Roman law who were to provide the key
executive servants of the new royal States .... It was the imprint of this international
corps of lawyers, more than any force, that Romanized the juridical system of
Western Europe in the Renaissance. 44
...

These historical references illustrate the discontinuity in the continuous state-constituent function of legal specialists. They remind one
of the role jurists played in "the fundamental transition of the relationship
of obedience from personalism to objectivism."s They also suggest that,
in some places and circumstances, the availability of lawyers for hire
made them into free agents who could thereafter advocate whatever class
interests they found to represent. Thus, English common lawyers could
become representatives for the parties in a protracted class struggle. In
France, the meaning of common law was different. Lawyers challenged
customary rights rooted in obsolete feudal or manorial arrangements or
43 Per capita taxation levels in England and France were almost the same around 1550; one
century later, per capita taxation, bearing mainly on the peasantry and the middle strata of the
Tiers Etat, was three to four times what it was in England. Nef estimates that "considerably more
than ten per cent of all French income, as compared with some two or three per cent of all English
income, was collected by the crown." J.U. Nef, Industry and Government in France and England
1540-1640 (New York Russell and Russell, 1957) at 129. By the early eighteenth century, however,
the Crown's power had diminished, the nobility was more unified and was trying to revive its
autonomy and challenge the tax levels imposed by the Crown. E. Kiser, "The Formation of State
Policy in Western European Absolutism" (1986-87) 3 Pol. and Soc., 259-95. On the French
Revolution, see generally. G. Lefebvre, The Coming ofthe FrenchRevolution (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton
University Press, 1947); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1979).
44 Anderson, supra, note 38 at 28.
45 G. Simmel, The Sociology of George Simmel, trans. K.H. Wolff (New York Free Press, 1950)
at 252.
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defended communal property rights which the Crown was also interested
in protecting. The law these lawyers "spoke" was that of the central
power and not the customary law used by the landed classes. When
two different legal systems are invoked in judicialized forms of class
struggle, law is more likely to be perceived as a human creation, a willed
and deliberate emanation of the state. Attacking the legal system then
becomes a political action. Because the limitations of legal redress are
more visibly connected with forms of domination, the reconstruction of
the state, in turn, cannot be conceived outside of the reconstruction of
the law. The judicialization of class conflict always, to some extent,
politicizes litigation, thereby compromising the pure objectivity of the
law's appearance.
The kind of services lawyers render, and their position in an incipient
market marks them as a special category of intellectual producers that
can never as a whole become "traditional" as can priests and academic
humanists (in the sense of Gramsci's theory of intellectuals). Because
lawyers represent interests, they can attach themselves to any class
comprised in a "historical block." If the coalition claims a hegemonic
role, it "both rules and directs." Its intellectuals therefore play an "organic"
role that is "directive and organizing, that is to say, educational, that
is to say [properly] intellectual." If the class for whom lawyers work
is no longer hegemonic, it is incapable "of intellectual light, of any
program, of any impulse toward reform or progress."4" It is then that
the intellectuals attached to this class become "traditional." Even in this
case, however, the lawyers and notaries play "a most important political-social role" because they connect the peasant mass to the local
or state administration bringing them within the nation's sphere of law.47
The law is not a mere superstructural mask of class domination that
the dominated could cast off as the unnecessary relic of the pre-liberation
past. It is an essential part of the organizing and connective functions
exercised from the platform of the state and throughout civil society
by a hegemonic class. Hegemonic power resides in a class' capacity
for harnessing "objectivity" from different sources (law, technology,
military superiority, and later economics and science) to its rule. Effective
counter-hegemonic challenges must necessarily include a demonstration
that objectivity is constructed socially by identifiable agencies and can
be recuperated into different visions of the legal system.

46 A. Gramsci, GHl
Intelettuali e l'Organizzazione della Cultura (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1971)
at 22-25.
47 Ibid
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In this respect, it is important to note that the venality of the market
can function to prepare a counter-hegemonic discourse within the existing
legal system.48 The contingent conditions for this occurrence are related
to the foundation of new states or new regimes. The citizen constitutive
function of lawyers must first merge with their state constituent function.
This happens when the claims that lawyers represent are increasingly
political and politicized. By "increasingly," it is meant that litigation
expressing society-wide conflict spreads, involving larger numbers of
people and claims, and at the same time, the legal arguments mobilized
in litigation delineate a challenge to the dominant conception of rights.
Thus, in periods of political mobilization triggered or punctuated by
interests which seek and find a legal expression, juridical practice is the
most likely to produce politically meaningful legal discourse. For this,
lawyers must be available to private interests that are neither controlled
by the sponsoring state apparatus, nor entirely under the thumb of the
local ruling class. Their availability requires the existence of a market
(or proto-market) of legal services.
Politicized legal discourse is likely to emerge in troubled times,
particularly in historical conditions where access to courts allows the
judicialization of class conflict. It is not, however, a direct political
instrument. It hovers between state and market where legists, working
in the courts to render "objective"justice (justice embodied in transcendent
law), participate in the institutional space where the eighteenth-century
bourgeoisie strove to create a public sphere. According to J. Habermas,
the arena of public opinion began to be formed with the Reformation,
when legally protected religious freedom became the first area of private
autonomy. The public sphere emerged gradually with the public assembly
of private individuals (those who held no office). Public authority came
into being with national and territorial states. Within it, the power of
the ruler was effectively depersonalized by the development of a state
apparatus. The lifeblood of the public sphere is public discussion. The
private bourgeois, in laying claim to the printed word (even the officially
regulated newspapers, journals, pamphlets, books), infiltrated the very
principle of absolutist power (from which, as private individuals, they
Root's Burgundian study is a significant example. He writes:
From the legal briefs one cannot easily distinguish the lawyers' attitudes from the peasants'....
As for the question of intent, lawyers and peasants had different interests. By challenging
seigneurial authority, lawyers could increase fees; the peasants could hope to reduce feudal
dues. Invoking the idea of a class alliance to account for their collaboration is gratuitous;
the notion that hostility to privilege motivated the lawyers is likewise gratuitous. Lawyers
were being paid to do a job and drew whatever legal arguments were at hand.
The result of the interaction between lawyers and their peasant clients was, nonetheless, that lawyers'
insistence that seigneurial rights had to be uniform through the province, and their interpretation
of the lord's terrieras having "originated in violence and ... being maintained by force" prepared
a revolutionary legal discourse. Root, supra, note 15 at 673, 678.
48
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were excluded) by means of "that very principle which demands that
proceedings be made public."49
The judicialization of class conflict constitutes an alternative to the
liberal model of the public sphere articulated principally by the press
- alternative both because it is part of the state apparatus and because
the typical cast of characters may be different. The bourgeois principle
of publicity was directed against absolutist court proceedings as a primary
target; this pulled the administration of justice from the sphere of public
authority toward the public sphere. Legal discourse became part of the
latter through the practical political application of the publicity principle.
Politics, not law by itself, carries the transformative content of new
legal discourse to the levels where it can become anew the "language
of the state." In a corollary movement, when bureaucratic authoritarian
regimes destroy even the pretense of liberalism, the judicial system may
once again become a battlefield, in which it is possible to maintain the
memory of an authentic public sphere.5o
Throughout the history of the modern state, law has been the form
in which the exercise of power, by accepting limits, seeks universal truth
conditions.s' In the courts, the constituent/constitutive function of lawyers
has articulated these limits into public and private domains. The courtroom
has been one of the stages where the spectacle of power-as-law is enacted.
Lawyers representing corporate entities or private individuals try to
influence, by argument, other lawyers who embody the impersonal power
of the law. The classic citizen constitutive functions of representation
and defense opened, for jurists, a special door to state-constituent and
legislative functions by giving them access to the courts. Both by their
structural position in the social division of labour and by the content
49 J. Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)" (1974) 3 New Ger.
Crit. 49 at 52.
50 In the contemporary period, the function of reconstituting liberal bourgeois guarantees of
rights is sometimes assumed by lawyers' organizations which thereby pass into the opposition. See
J.C. Viladas, "The Legal Profession in Spain" (Address to the Working Group for the Study of
the Legal Professions, International Sociological Association, Bellagio, 16-21 July 1984) [unpublished]; J. Falcao, "The Legal Profession in Brazil" Ibid [unpublished]. Sometimes the opposition
to torture, despite the deep change of meaning and systematic contemporary uses of physical violence,
seems to recover in discourse some link to the past by implying there was a kind of barbarism
which we had "left behind." On the subject of the symbolism of torment, as against the uses of
direct (though non-cruent) control of bodies, see Foucault, supra, note 26.
51 This does not mean to endorse the reduction of legitimation to pure legality, such as is
effected by Niklas Luhmann's interpretation of Weber. Habermas objects to Luhmann's legal
positivism that procedural legality "guarantees as such only that the authorities ... bear the
responsibility for valid law. But these authorities are part of a system of authority which must
be legitimized as a whole if pure legality is to be able to count as an indication of legitimacy."
J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978) at 101. I tend
toward the position that legitimation depends on the successful assertion of hegemony, which includes
the objectivity of law in its arsenal of instruments.

1986]

Depolhtzation and Lawyers' Functions

of their activities, lawyers are the most immediately and inherently political
of all organized occupations.
The jurists' appropriation of legal discourse can become either a
prelude to the development of properly political discourse or an alternative
to the latter. The outcome is determined by the whole complexity of
structure and historical conjuncture. A few crucial conditions have been
identified.52 These include: the articulation of private and public domains
with a sense that private boundaries cannot be legitimately transgressed
by the state, the emergence and advance of systems of justice attached
to centralizing (or centripetal) power, the consequent professionalization
of the judicial personnel and a basis for standardization and unification
of the law, codification of the law and the possibility of teaching it as
a formal discipline, the right of subjects to address the courts and to
be represented in them, the emergence of a potential market for lawyers'
services, the development and maturation of a public sphere, and the
public opinion formed therein about justice and the legal system.
C.

The Matrix of Depoliticization
Professions are occupations that, by virtue of their special characteristics and their expertise, claim control of the services they render
to society. Control involves gatekeeping and patrolling both the borders
and the territory so defined. Within this protected territory, professions
claim autonomy in the name of monopolized competence. Autonomy
and competence are inseparable in theory and also as practical objectives.
The practical conditions of even the lowest levels of professional autonomy
(operational discretion in ordinary practice) cannot be permanently
secured because they are contingent on too many factors that professions
in no way control. At the most general level, the constellation of relevant
factors is defined by the mode of production, the nature of the state
and its apparatus, basic characteristics of civil society (for instance, the
position of women), and the broad idiosyncrasies of the culture.53 The
52 These conditions are more basic than, for instance, the judicial right of legislative review,

so often highlighted in the case of the United States. R. Berger, Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977);
S.P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe" (1966) 18 World Pol. 378. Most
institutional arrangements come into use as a consequence of political developments, such as these
conditions essentially are.
53 These would be comparable in generality, though not necessarily in content, to Parsons'
pattern-variables. T. Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951) at 46-67, 101-12.
In an insightful article on "Status Strain in the Professions," Andrew Abbott implies that the
"great transformation" led to a cultural shift in the criteria by which public status was generally
accorded to professionals: from gentlemaniness (and therefore closeness to the aristocracy in practice
as well as in manners) to a particular view of professional effectiveness ("effective contact with
the disorderly"), that I would connect with deeper changes in the relationship of society and culture
to the transformation and the domination of nature. A. Abbott, "Status and Status Strain in the
Professions" (1981) 86 Am. J. of Soc. 819.
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combination of factors obviously varies in time, as does the factors'
relevance to the profession considered.
For lawyers, the most important elements in the constellation are
the structure of the state and the extension of its powers. The size,
recruitment, and organization of the judicial branch of the profession
are immediately dependent upon the state, as is the existence and openness
of state-constituent functions for jurists in general. The most significant
impact of the state on the category of lawyers may well have been indirect.
The expansionist tendency of public systems of education in response
to demographic and social pressure has affected all occupations based
on educated labour, though perhaps none as much as the legal profession.54
In addition, the functions assumed by the state have grown in number,
diversity, depth, and extension, especially in those countries whose
governments have been under social democratic control or influence.
This has provided lawyers with new tasks of mediation and representation
to perform. The number of lawyers employed at all levels by the state
has grown faster than the number of private practitioners in almost all
Western-type countries.s The expansion and diversification of functions
into various welfare state configurations redraws the boundaries between
the public and the private. Private life is penetrated by many bureaucratizing effects, rules, and regulating influences that can be resisted or
broken by one or the other side. The sphere of legal defense is therefore
potentially enlarged.56 At the same time, the mechanisms by which the
state has performed or delegated its more benign functions perfect the
transformation of power from power-as-law and repression into a
multiplicity of points of intervention at which human existence and human
bodies are directly taken in charge. Foucault writes that the juridical
system is:
•.. utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not
insured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment
54 The numbers of lawyers have grown at an accelerated rate in all the countries studied
by the Working Group for the Comparative Study of Legal Professions. These include, alphabetically:
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, England and Wales, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland, Spain, the U.S.A., Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. For
a summary of the figures on growth, see R.L. Abel, "Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions:
An Exploratory Essay" (1985) A.B.F. Research J. 1.
55 Ibid at 25-26. The combined effect of these trends related to the expansion of state functions
includes, in some countries, the appearance of paraprofessionals of various types, representation
by non-lawyers in administrative courts, and the increase in the ratio of lawyers per judge, with
the consequent increase in litigation and in court backlog.
56 Carole Joffe's penetrating studies of "welfare" functions that the state - at least before
Reagan - subsidized in part and delegated to "benign" agencies of child care and planned parenthood
reveal a disturbing willingness of private citizens to submit their intimate life to a regulating and
uniforming effect See, in particular, her forthcoming book, The Regulation of Sexuality: Experiences
of Family Planning Workers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
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but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go
beyond the state and its apparatus.... [T]he juridical is increasingly incapable

of coding power, of serving as its system of representation.57

The expansion of the rule-governed areas of life independent from
the legal form can also occur under various forms of "delegalization"
that return certain disputes to prepublic and more or less authentic
communal handling. In all cases, complementary or alternative rules have
important implications for legal practice.
The second important extraprofessional factor for lawyers has been
the concentration and centralization of units of production with the
attendant phenomena of rationalization of production and worldwide
expansion of markets.58 The large corporation, with its vocation and
capacity for planning, is a legal actor whose influence and effects, both
in society and on the law, are of the same order as those of the
contemporary state, though not quite of the same depth and extension.
It is an artifact created and perfected by lawyers, thus its growth has
logically found an echo in the growth of the large legal firm that serves
its needs. The continued growth and diversification of the bureaucratized
units of capitalist production involve them with the law in anticipation
of its rulings, in the preparation of contracts, in the ubiquitousness of
their relationships with governments, in the extreme complexity of the
relationships of competition, combination, and merger with other entities
in the late days of monopoly capitalism, and, of course, in litigation.
Therefore, in practically all the capitalist economies, corporations have
their own legal departments that, in some countries, occupy the place
of the American large law firm in the prestige hierarchy of the legal
profession.59
Beyond the prevention of legal problems, one of the most important
tasks of inside counsel is to organize and oversee the legal services
Foucault, supra, note 32 at 89.
Ever since the first period of growth in lawyers' numbers in sixteenth and seventeenthcentury Europe, the numerical fluctuations in the legal profession have been related to the volume
of business both directly and indirectly insofar as business enriched at least some sectors of the
upper and middle classes from which lawyers' clients were (and still are) mostly drawn. Sixteenthcentury English solicitors, for instance, were involved in conveyancing although they did not yet
monopolize it; they must have benefitted greatly from the large increase in land transactions after
Henry vII's appropriation of church lands. Stone, supra, note 39 at 73-74. During the nineteenth
century, lawyers' numbers seem to have fluctuated irregularly in the U.S., in England, Scotland,
and Belgium "perhaps in response to the business cycle of booms and busts." Abel, supra, note
54 at 19.
59 See, for instance, reports by John Johnson and Luc Huyse about the prestige of legal counsel
for large corporations in Norway and Belgium, respectively. J. Johnson, "The Legal Profession
in Norway" (Address to the Working Group for Comparative Study of the Legal Profession,
International Sociological Association, Bellagio, 16-21 July 1984) [unpublished]; Luc Huyse, "The
Legal Profession in Belgium" Ibid [unpublished].
57
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provided by outsiders.6o The legal department of the large corporation
has thus become a centre for what Daniel Bell calls "the management
of organized complexity" and for the coordinationof important litigation,
collective bargaining, and intercorporate relations. The resolution of these
matters in courts or, most frequently, by negotiation, institutionalizes
organizational and power shifts rooted, though not contained, in the
economy.
Routine matters are handled differently. The same industrial conditions which called for the internalization of legal services allowed the
standardization of products and of specifications. Most of what inside
counsel does is not properly legal, but bureaucratic, relying on records
and regulations. Lawyers are likely to preside over the rationalization
of documents, rules, and procedures, and, like any bureaucrat, are quite
likely to produce rigidification. The preparation of such measures with
a "legal eye" may represent the major form of prevention (through
standardized planning), making lawyers' interventions unnecessary in the
future. These practices (that may be called "antilegal" or "paralegal")
include the unilateral terms imposed on the less powerful business
associate or on the consumer. This is often done through the fine print
of order forms and standard guarantees, or in the contractual substitutes
used by insurance companies. Beyond this are the technical specifications
of mass production drafted by non-lawyer experts.61

Major trends in social and cultural life are much more difficult to
isolate, even tentatively, since not many features of contemporary social
60 A. Chayes & A. Chayes, "Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm" (1985) 37 Stan.
L. Rev. 277; J.C. Freund, "Comment" (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 301.
61 The parallel between the corporation and the modem state lies in the structural features
common to both. These include the corporate form, the bureaucratic organization, the deployment
of expertise, the centralization/decentralization of decisions, the disproportionate resources which
can be mobilized by a single giant unit, the planned management of uncertainty, a structural bias
against democracy and publicity beyond the circles of 'the competent', the reliance on manipulation
through mass media, and many others. The large corporation penetrates social life more effectively
by means of its products than through its advertising. The commodities put in circulation by mass
production incorporate the kind of scientific management, engineering design, and standardized
pre-legal planning that permit the emergence of one variety of legal counterattack by organized
consumers or their advocates.
It is important to note here that the conditions for the assignment of blame to producers
are complex and ambiguous: on the one hand, it could be argued that the idea of responsibility
for the quality and integrity of a product placed on the market goes back, ultimately, to guild
regulation of craftsmanship. On the other hand, while individual consumers' grievances are often
against retailers, class actions seek monetary compensation from large producers because that is
all the compensation tort law allows. Also, it is difficult to imagine claims lodged against manufacturers
whose small scale and technologically backward or underdeveloped methods would exclude 'scientific'
control of the product. It seems to me that the vast zone of production in between production
controlled by the individual worker (as in craft-organization) and production controlled by a
bureaucracy is where most ambiguity lies. See A.L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production: A Comparative Study" (1959-60) 4 Admin. Sci. Quart. 168.
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life are independent from the state or the large corporation. Cultural
and ideological traits, including those that condition the perception of
injurious experiences, are variable and fluid, with effects almost impossible
to demonstrate.62 Habermas characterizes the socio-cultural system in
advanced capitalist societies as "civil privatism" corresponding to "the
structures of a depoliticized public realm." It is complemented by
"familial-vocational privatism," which "consists in a family orientation
with developed interests in consumption and leisure on the one hand,
and in a career orientation suitable to status competition on the other."63
The crisis of motivation diagnosed by Habermas lies both in the
dismantling of pre-bourgeois traditions and the undermining of "corecomponents of bourgeois ideology, such as possessive individualism and
achievement orientation... by changes in the social structure."6,
The entirety of Habermas' typification and its exact implications
for a sociology of lawyers will not be examined here. It is, however,
a good theoretical background on which to begin mapping the political
implications of lawyers' work as a comparative basis for analysis. Out
of this historically grounded theoretical matrix, the study of lawyers can
move more securely into societies which neither structurally nor culturally
have developed along the same lines or gone as far.
At the most general level, the relevance of Habermas' diagnostic
matrix for the analysis of the legal profession is immediate.65 The objective
conditions of civil and familial-vocational privatism include both a
depoliticized public realm and the expansion of the educational system
and other branches of the welfare state. The privatism of career choice
is the motivational base to which ultimately corresponds the over-supply
of professional workers. The demand for this kind of labour power
originates in the rationalization of industrial production and in the

Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra, note 5 at 652.
Habermas, supra, note 51 at 75 passim. In Habermas' legitimation crisis, the concept of
"privatism" is developed as the central element of the motivation crisis. The socio-cultural system
primarily feeds into the society "syndromes of civil and familial-vocational privatism." Obviously,
the underpinnings of such motivational inputs are institutional and structural. Thus, civil privatism
means that most citizens are interested in "the steering and maintenance performances of the
administrative system," though not much in its legitimation (efficiency and effectiveness, in other
words, are their own legitimation). Their desiccated participation in properly political aspects is
what the institutions of governance actually call for. Too much democratic participation would
be seen at the levels of command as a "crisis of governability." Ibid
64 Ibid at 79 passim.
65 Since my comments are based on existing studies of lawyers and lawyering, much of their
content has obviously already been hypothesized and partly tested. The most complete bibliography
on "the emergence and transformation of disputes" is that given by Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra,
note 5 at 632. See also A. Sarat & L.F. Felstiner, supra, note 28.
62
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expansion of both the commercial service sector and the state. Through
these processes of rationalization and expansion, the commodity form
and bureaucratic or legal rules penetrate areas of private and public
interaction that were before only informally regulated.
The erosion of traditional authoritarian patterns within the family
and communal solidarity relations renders interpersonal conflict increasingly difficult to contain. Young people and women increasingly seek
emancipation (both collectively and individually). The support of relatives,
friends, and comrades is often either unavailable or insufficient. The
implication is that disputes emerge more frequently out of the family
context and into a semi-public arena where lawyers can intervene.66 In
turn, the increased availability of lawyers makes it more likely that a
grievance will become a claim.67 This speculation is, however, misleading.
In most countries, "people remain reluctant to consult lawyers even when
their services are free and accessible."68 The organization of familial
relations is highly influenced by religion and race and plays a large part
in determining who is likely to see a lawyer about such matters as divorce,
alimony, and child support.69
The blurred borderline between the private and the public domain
is now inhabited by a variety of professional workers (state-subsidized
workers in the social field, in physical and mental health, and the still
very important minister or priest) who compete successfully with lawyers
in the handling of grievances.70 In fact, the matters for which most
individuals use lawyers are still likely to be property matters and not
interpersonal conflicts. The former are predictably differentiated by
income and class.
The penetration of experts into private areas of social life and the
corollary exposure of more people to professional services (in particular
health-related ones) has complex effects on the legalization of interpersonal disputes. If it is true that "there is probably a low level of perceived
injurious experience in the relationship between lay persons and pro-

66 The most obvious and important example is that of offenses against women, which are
more readily recognized as injurious to the victims in the general ideological climate created by
the women's movement. N.H. Rafter & E.A. Stanko, eds., Judge Lawyer Victim, Thief. Women,
Gender Roles and CriminalJustice (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1982) c. 2-4.
67 Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra,note 5 at 81.
68 Abel, supra, note 54 at 35; Abel, supra, note 3 at 602, note 768.
69 See L. Mayhew & A.J. Reiss, Jr., "The Social Organization of Legal Contracts" (1969)
34 Am. Soc. Rev. 309.
70Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra,note 5 at 639-49.
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fessionals," much of the potential conflict arising from these contacts
71
remains unprocessed.
The way in which the delivery of legal services is structured makes
a difference in the perception and handling of injuries. In the United
States, the contingency fee enables many medical malpractice suits to
be attempted. The contingency fee may contribute to keeping open the
rewards of entrepreneurship and the promises of a free-lance career in
law. Much more interestingly, however, it has become an avenue through
which the legal profession uses its position as gatekeeper to state sanctions,
with the unintended consequences of transforming practice and recruitment in certain medical specialties.
One of Habermas' central propositions is that the reproduction of
bourgeois culture as a whole has always depended on the mobilization
of traditional residues. This is because bourgeois ideology has been too
"disconsolate, individualistic, and objective" to offer sufficient moral
support for individual hfe.72 One can speculate that liberal justice (an
essentially bourgeois creation) may tend to take the place of waning
traditional beliefs. Formal justice may subconsciously appear to some
people as a form of reordering what is disordered or as an authentic
way of setting things right. Jurists are the official gatekeepers of this
form of invocation and, therefore, its beneficiaries. They are, however,
also exposed to the cynicism and mistrust created by disappointment.
Several studies have found an inverse relationship between positive
attitudes toward the courts and direct experience with them.7 Even before
getting to the courts, ordinary individuals are warned against litigation.
If the case is accepted, the pressure to settle out of court or to bargain
in a plea is high.74 Lawyers fear the loss of potential business clients
or trade union retaliation and seek to avoid the risks of losing time
and money involved in representing clients who belong to discriminated
social categories and are likely to face a handicap in court.75

71 Ibid at 653.
72Habermas, supra,note 51 at 77-78.
73Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, supra, note 5 at 651; J.D. Casper, "Having their Day in Court:
Defendant Evaluation of the Fairness of their Treatment" (1978) 12 Law and Soc'y Rev. 237;

B.A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public"The FinalReportof a NationalSurvey (Chicago: American
Bar Foundation, 1977).
74 Blumberg, supra, note 28; L.H. Ross, Settled Out of Court (Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company, 1970).
75 J.F. Handler, EJ. Hollingsworth, & H.S. Erlanger, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights

(New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1978); P.R. Lochner, Jr., "The No Fee and Low Fee Legal
Practice of Private Attorneys" (1975) 9 Law and Soc'y Rev. 431; Macaulay, supra,note 28; Mayhew
& Reiss, supra, note 69.
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Evidence from the United States suggests that the experience of
ordinary citizens with formal justice is likely to undermine their sense
of confidence and empowerment as citizens, even as they participate
in the actualization of their rights.76 The legalization of disputes expropriates the lay person's problem, reducing him or her to an accessory
role as the esoteric language and complexity of procedure exclude from
participation all but the "competent speakers." Consultations and negotiations offer the client "vision of law in which particular parts of
the self are valued while others are denied."77 The legal self constructed
by lawyers outside and inside of court "legitimate[s] some parts of human
experience and den[ies] the relevance of others," but it does so implicitly,
without revealing the reductions, excisions, and reordering of priorities
operating upon the litigant's experience.78 In the United States, the
experience of tort litigation inevitably converts the search for redress
and reordering into the acceptance of compensatory payments. The
monetization of a majority of common disputes effectively reinforces
the ideological one-dimensionality of capitalist society. The expression
of worth, right, recognition, and participation in the institutional world
is always ultimately reducible to money terms.
The mediation that lawyers perform between individuals and the
legal system continues to have essential implications for the constitution
of citizenship. The defense and advocacy of civil rights through the courts,
the rights implicitly actualized in the public defense of criminal cases,
the advancement of economic rights that is sometimes achieved against
corporate defendants in personal injury litigation, and class actions all
indicate the fundamental political importance of the representation and
defense functions of lawyers. Their indispensability is most clearly revealed

76 Evidence drawn chiefly from the United States is obviously not conclusive. The particular
organization of the delivery of legal services, the strong market ideology, the multiplicity of often
overlapping jurisdictions, the nature of the adversarial system, and specific features of the law
are among the surface factors that demand comparative review. In other societies, (for instance,
Germany. See D. Rueschemeyer, LawyersandtheirSociety:AComparativeStudy oftheLegalProfesson
in Germany and the U.S. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), legal practice is not as
determined by the nature of the client, nor as subordinate to the client's will. More importantly,
the absence of a strong labor movement and of strong left parties in the United States precludes
developments characteristic of western European social-democracies: not only the different forms
of provision of legal aid by trade unions, social democratic parties, or the social democratic state
(Abel, supra, note 3), but also the participation of lawyers in drafting the architecture of neocorporatism. See L. Huyse, "The Legal Profession in Belgium" (Address to the Working Group
for the Comparative Study of the Legal Professions, International Sociological Association, Aixen-Provence Meeting, 1985) [unpublished].
77 Sarat & Felstiner, supra,note 28 at 132.
78 Ibid at 117.
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in their breach, in the violation of rights, and of due process. 79 What
is necessary, however, even indispensable, is not always sufficient. In

advanced capitalist societies, legal representation contributes to forming
an image of citizenship that is individual, technical, partial, monetized,

and, especially, non-autonomous.
The legal construction of the political self goes beyond the actual
experience of negotiation and litigation. The legalization of collective
conflicts does more than extract the potential for violence from the civil
society and encode conflict into legal frameworks designed to blunt its

meaning. It also diverts the protagonists from seeking redress through
political pressure and, eventually, through legislation as opposed to

litigation.80 The diffusion of knowledge about legalization, moreover, often
induces politically active people to anticipate possible lawyers' moves

and to censor properly political actions in accordance.8,
The citizen constitutive function of lawyers logically contributes to
the general depoliticization of advanced capitalism. What alternative

discourse or arena is open for the stubborn hope of setting things right
if the ordinary person's experience with formal justice is likely to be
depoliticizing, disempowering, and substantively unjust? Politics is the
only democratic way, but one increasingly desiccated by privatization

and the objective disenfranchisement of the mass of citizens in neo
corporatist bourgeois democracies. An old way of asking for order is

prayer. We now turn to the expert discourses of medicine, science, and
79 It is a sad comment, however, that civil rights litigation should have such low prestige
and such small representation in one of the most exhaustive studies available of an urban bar:.
in Chicago Lawyers, the authors report that only fourteen out of 699 practising lawyers devoted
more than 25 percent of their time to civil rights and that half of them were government employees.
J.P. Heinz & E.O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyer" The Social Structure of the Bar (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1982) at 78, note 18. Despite the fact that civil rights lawyers who had attended
elite law schools were twice as many as those in the next more prestigious "personal plight" field
(criminal prosecution), the specialty as a whole ranked twentieth in a field of thirty, reflecting
in this the low status of fields related to individual or small business clients. Among these, civil
rights was the most prestigious. Ibid at 103, table 4.3.
so The actual sequence and mechanisms of the correlation are likely to make this impressionistic
comment entirely wrong. Nevertheless, it is intriguing to note the gross inverse correlation there
appears to be between the number of lawyers per capita (or better, if one could measure it, the
ideological view of the law as a way of righting things) and the absence of left opposition and
political unionism in the United States. Italy would represent the corollary reverse example.
81I rely on my experience with the leadership of a local union bent on legalizing every
disagreement and extremely dependent on its lawyer. I have found that the political consequence
of decisions or of members' moves were systematically disregarded by the leadership if they did
not have judicial validity. For example, the threat by an influential female member to file an EEOC
complaint against a union was seen as "something that would drag on in court for ten years"
and not as the political move it was. Conversely, rank-and-file activists objected to the political
implications of a grievance filed by the union on behalf of a faculty member punished for "grave
misconduct" by peer review. However, anticipating the moves of the union and the plaintiff's lawyer,
the activists refrained from political actions such as organizing dissent or threatening collective
resignation for fear that the lawyers would then have a stronger case "because of political pressure."
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technology. The latter has become the fundamental expression of power.
It is as servants and gatekeepers of this power that jurists can occasionally
orchestrate the interventions of experts and assign them responsibility
vis-a-vis those who have neither the authority nor the power to speak.
In the delivery of state-sponsored adjudications (malpractice litigation),
jurists can appropriate a meta-professional role through their capacity
to legalize personal and collective catastrophes and to manage the resulting
procedural complexity. This is a relatively new political role that jurists
perform, although they do so haphazardly, only where and when it is
possible, and with unclear consequences.
What is the contemporary counterpart of the jurists' state-constituent
functions, if one leaves aside their diminishing overrepresentation in
government82 Lawyers have a secure hold on the elaboration of corporative
agreements between actors representing interest associations (mainly
economic, but also political, religious, and cultural) and the state.83 What
is significant in such agreements, according to Luc Huyse, is that "all
its actors... perform as fullbodied decision-makers.., parliament mostly
can take no other action than as an applause machine."84 Social democratic
countries are the examples most often cited. There, neo-corporatist trends
arise from the state's attempt to establish with its guidance and assistance
"private interest governments with devolved public responsibilities agencies of regulated self-regulation of social groups with special interests
that are made subservient to general interests by appropriately designed"
institutional arrangements.8s
The jurists' familiarity with the contractual prefiguration of contingencies prepares them for the role of providing "precise and complex
procedural scripts to guide negotiations between corporatist interest
groups, and between them and the state."86

In countries where neither social democracy nor neo-corporatism
are developed, lawyers nevertheless perform a comparable structural
function. The inter- or intra-organizational agreements lawyers help to
draft (such as collective bargaining agreements, tender offers, mergers,
patents, loans, bond issues, etcetera)are private only in appearance. Their
hidden "public" character is revealed by four features. First, in many
82 Abel, supra, note 54 at 27-28.

83 T.C. Halliday, "Lawyers and the State: A Neo-Corporatist Agenda for Comparative Inquiry"
(Address to the Working Group for the Comparative Study of the Legal Professions, International
Sociological Association, Bellagio, 16-21 July 1984) [unpublished].
8 Huyse, supra, note 76 at 6.
85 W. Streeck & P. Schmitter, "Commodity, Market, State - and Association?" (Sixth
Colloquium of the European Group for the Study of Organizations, Florence, 1983).
86 Huyse, supra, note 76 at 7.
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of these cases, the very size of the actors makes their behaviour

immediately relevant to the general interest. Second, many arrangements
(labour contracts, mergers, possible trusts, certain forms of trade and

communication, and the like) are directly monitored by state agencies.
Third, the state intervenes as a direct partner in innumerable contractual
agreements with the private sector. More importantly, lawyers represent
a sort of "shadow state" in private agreements between the large units

of the private sector (or between them and the state) precisely because
they see it as their function to keep these agreements and their clients'
actions within the law of the state.87 Finally, these structural arrangements

that can and do have enormous impact on the lives and welfare of many
people remain largely free from public supervision and regulation. The

privatization and depoliticization of the lawyers' state-constituent functions is determined by the nature of the state in which they operate
and by the intensity of political demands for public control.88
In conclusion, the classic functions of the lawyers marked them as
the most inherently political of all specialized workers. The political
content of their functions changes with the historical transformation of
the economic, social, and political matrix in which jurists work. Not
the least important of the changes in the meaning of lawyers' work is
the tendency for the legitimizing ideology of legalism to be displaced.

This substitution also participates in the general process of depoliticization
which is understood as one that minimizes human practice and conceals
it within the objectified language of a scientistic ideology.89 The depoliticization and repoliticizing content of lawyers' functions in particular
historical contexts can be objectively determined. It cannot and should
87 Chayes & Chayes, supra, note 60; Freund, supra, note 60 at 301-304. It is also telling
that the Chicago lawyers, studied by Heinz and Laumann, list as the most prestigious legal specialties
that lead to involvement with the federal government and with federal courts while prestige is
negatively associated with appearance in state courts. I think this can be interpreted as a recognition
that intermediation between the corporation and the state is intellectually the most challenging
and professionally the most powerful function lawyers perform. Heinz & Laumann, supra, note
79 at 103, table 4.3 and c. 4. In passing, it is also possible to read in a different key Andrew
Abbott's interesting interpretation of intraprofessional prestige as a function of "purity," or remoteness
from the pain and messiness of human affairs: purity itself could be enhanced by the closeness
to either a state constituent function, or the production of politically significant discourse. This
would not be true of all professions. Abbott, supra, note 53.
88 An interesting suggestion can be derived from Heinz and Laumann's study of Washington
lawyers: it is at this level, where intermediatation between powerful private units and the state
is either directly or indirectly present in lawyers' work, that the increase in the numbers of highpowered lawyers can make a difference. Because the client can pick and choose (and is helped
in this by the presence and advice of house counsel), the autonomy of the corporate lawyer visa-vis his powerful clients may be reduced still further. Heinz & Laumann, supra, note 79; Lochner,
supra, note 75.
89 M.S. Larson, "The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power" in T.L.
Haskell, ed., The Authority of Experts Studies in History and Theory (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press, 1984).
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not situate a whole occupational category but should instead allow one
to connect its functional divisions and its internal stratification with
reasoned hypotheses about the political potential and the political consequences of specific practices.

